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Abstract
Formal analyses of incentives for compliance with network protocols often appeal to game-
theoretic models and concepts. Applications of game-theoretic analysis to network security
have generally been limited to highly stylized models, where simplified environments enable
tractable study of key strategic variables. We propose a simulation-based approach to game-
theoretic analysis of protocol compliance, for scenarios with large populations of agents and
large policy spaces. We define a general procedure for systematically exploring a structured
policy space, directed expressly to resolve the qualitative classification of equilibrium behavior
as compliant or non-compliant. The techniques are illustrated and exercised through an exten-
sive case study analyzing compliance incentives for introduction-based routing. We find that
the benefits of complying with the protocol are particularly strong for nodes subject to attack,
and the overall compliance level achieved in equilibrium, while not universal, is sufficient to
support the desired security goals of the protocol.
1 Incentive Analysis of Network Protocol Compliance
Designers of a network security protocol typically start from an interest in properties satisfied by
a system assuming all participants comply with the protocol. This is often followed by consider-
ation of whether compliance can be imposed or enforced in some way, or more flexibly whether
autonomous agents would voluntarily comply, or whether they can be incentivized to do so. The
behavior of interacting autonomous agents is the province of game theory, which provides a general
mathematical framework for characterizing rational decisions in a multiagent environment [Leyton-
Brown and Shoham, 2008]. Solution concepts such as Nash equilibrium offer a basis for predicting
what rational agents will do when faced with strategic decisions.1
Consider a system ofN agents, where agent i chooses a strategy si from a set of available strate-
gies S. (We do not need to assume symmetry, but do so now for descriptive simplicity.) A protocol
∗Presented at the Twelfth Workshop on the Economics of Information Security, Washington, DC, June 2013.
1This is not to say that such predictions will be very accurate, nor even the best one can do. We consider equilibrium
as a starting point, but advocate bringing in behavioral theories [Camerer, 2003] or indeed any other information that may
be predictive for a particular scenario. To a large extent we cast our methods in terms of general solution concepts, so
that they can be adapted to account for such information when it is available and formalizable in such terms.
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can be defined as a partition of S into the compliant strategies, SC, and the non-compliant strategies,
SN .2 A strategy profile s = (s1, . . . , sN ) is compliant if si is in SC for all i. More generally, we
may characterize the level of compliance of a (mixed) profile based on how many (in expectation)
agents’ strategies are compliant. The straightforward way to address the compliance question for
a particular environment is to solve the associated game with respect to some appropriate solution
concept (e.g., equilibrium definition), and assess the (level of) compliance of solution profiles.
Game-theoretic modeling has seen increasing application to problems in networking [Han et al.,
2011, Srivastava et al., 2006] and security in particular [Grossklags et al., 2008, Roy et al., 2010,
Vratonjic et al., 2010]. Some of this work addresses protocol compliance specifically, for exam-
ple, Cˇagalj et al. [2005] analyze incentives to comply with random packet deferment in CSMA/CA
protocols. They conclude that selfish nodes invariably violate the protocol in equilibrium, and pro-
pose methods to recover efficiency (essentially another level of protocol, for which compliance is
an equilibrium) through enforceable cooperation among the violators. In this and other studies,
the game model is necessarily a highly stylized version of the underlying network scenario. Well-
crafted stylized models can produce valid and valuable insights, but always raise questions about
whether their implications hold for richer environments that would be intractable for game-theoretic
analysis. Often, researchers further evaluate their results through simulation studies. For example,
Vratonjic et al. [2012] model a content-monetization game as a two-player interaction between a
web publisher and user, and then evaluate the derived publisher strategy in simulation over a het-
erogeneous population of users. Combining game-theoretic analysis with simulation can especially
increase confidence when the simulation environment relaxes assumptions imposed for tractability
in the game-theoretic model, as in the analysis by Chen and Leneutre [2007] of wireless networks
where nodes may tamper with contention windows.
For many network security protocols, it is not apparent how to define stylized environments that
faithfully capture incentive issues of interest yet support tractable game-theoretic treatments. For
example, the set S of possible strategies may be too large (e.g., highly dimensional), or the scenarios
as most naturally defined may include too many players, or excessively complex dynamics and
information structures. Hope always remains for clever modeling or algorithmic ideas to get beyond
such obstacles, but in the meantime it is inappropriate to avoid systematic analysis of incentives in
these domains. We therefore pursue a simulation approach, not as mere adjunct of game-theoretic
analysis, but as a means to game-theoretic modeling. The basic idea is to explore a restricted space
of heuristic strategies, employing simulation to estimate payoffs that can then be incorporated in a
game model.
Because the search is (purposely) restricted, this technique should not be expected to precisely
characterize solutions to the underlying game. For the question at hand—protocol compliance—
however, we are not necessarily interested in characterizing exactly what the participating agents
will do. Rather, we ask the coarser question of whether their behavior is consistent with the specified
protocol. The novel methodological contribution of this work is a procedure that directs exploration
of strategy space toward answering this compliance incentive question.
The application driving our development of the procedure is a network protocol, introduction-
based routing, designed to incentivize responsible management of connection paths [Frazier et al.,
2011]. We briefly describe this protocol in the next section. Section 3 follows with a detailed de-
scription of our empirical game-theoretic methods for analyzing protocol compliance in complex
2Our search procedure generalizes this to consider compliance a matter of degree, but we adopt the binary distinction
here to simplify the motivating discussion.
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domains. The results of applying these methods to the case-study domain are presented in Sec-
tion 4. Our study provides evidence for substantial but not universal compliance with the protocol
in equilibrium. The analysis further suggests that whereas the realized compliance level is sufficient
to support the basic security goals of the protocol in these scenarios, additional incentives applied
to nodes not directly subject to attack could improve overall compliance significantly.
2 Case Study: Introduction-Based Routing
The introduction-based routing (IBR) protocol represents a promising approach to deterring ma-
licious behavior on networks [Frazier et al., 2011]. By requiring an explicit connection before
transmitting a message, IBR participants exert enhanced control over network activity. New con-
nections are formed exclusively through introduction by parties with existing connections to the
requested endpoints, ensuring that there is a trail of responsibility behind every decision to accept
a new communication partner. Ensuring quality connections requires that participants pay attention
to evidence of misbehavior, maintain reputation assessments for their connections, and propagate
misbehavior reports throughout the network. The protocol does not employ any form of global rep-
utation mechanism, but rather relies on each node to maintain summary assessments of the nodes it
has received information about.
The goal of strategic analysis in this domain is to establish whether network participants have
adequate incentive to follow the rules of the IBR protocol. Even if one accepts the security claims
of IBR proponents, the question of individual benefits to IBR compliance is an open question. An
incentive analysis aims to determine whether or under what conditions nodes would indeed choose
to comply, given full autonomy over that decision in service of their own interests. Al-Bayaty and
Kreidl [2013] show, under certain assumptions on attacks and detection, that the optimal policy for
deciding whether to close or continue a connection based on feedback reports takes the form of a
reputation threshold policy, just as IBR dictates. This bolsters confidence in compliance plausibility,
but leaves open several modes by which individual nodes may still choose not to comply, for exam-
ple by failing to propagate attack information or indiscriminately introducing connections despite
previous experience. Further modeling and analysis may illuminate the incentive tradeoffs for each
element of the IBR policy, though this will likely prove tractable only for highly simplified network
environments.
As established through extensive simulation studies [Frazier et al., 2011], IBR networks are
highly resistant to attack when all non-malicious nodes follow the protocol. We seek to validate
in these same rich simulation environments that following the protocol is a reasonable behavior to
expect from these nodes. To do so, we first need to define what it means to comply with the protocol.
We start with the compliant policy recommended by the protocol designers, which includes a set of
user-modifiable parameters, such as reputation thresholds for making and accepting introductions,
thresholds for terminating existing connections, and amounts to increment or decrement reputations
based on various forms of positive or negative feedback. Strategies in a specified region of this
parameter space are classified as compliant (members of SC), and those outside the region are
considered non-compliant (SN ).
Whether IBR compliance is individually beneficial clearly depends on the context of compliance
decisions made by others. To reason about whether the IBR protocol is likely to be adopted by a
community, the benefits at any given level of compliance by others can help us assess the plausibility
of alternate adoption paths. The game modeling approach pursued here can in principle provide a
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basis for reasoning not only about the existence of compliant equilibria, but also the dynamics of
adoption that might lead to such equilibria.
3 Methods
3.1 Approach: Empirical Game-Theoretic Analysis
In empirical game-theoretic analysis (EGTA) [Wellman, 2006], techniques from simulation, search,
and statistics combine with game-theoretic concepts to characterize strategic properties of a domain.
The approach is a hybrid of analytical and agent-based modeling methods, and often appeals to
evolutionary search techniques as well [Phelps et al., 2010]. The basic EGTA step is simulation
of a strategy profile, determining a payoff observation (i.e., a sample drawn from the outcome
distribution generated by the simulation environment), which gets added to the database of payoffs.
Based on the accumulated data, we induce an empirical game model, typically (and in this work) a
normal-form representation with payoffs estimated as the sample mean observed in simulation, for
profiles that have been so evaluated.
The EGTA proceeds iteratively, with results from analyzing intermediate game models em-
ployed to guide the selection of further profiles to sample. This naturally supports a dynamic ap-
proach to game formulation. Whereas the full strategy space allowed by the simulator may be
large or infinite, computational constraints limit the profiles for which we can obtain direct outcome
observations. Therefore, it makes sense to start from the most salient strategy candidates at first,
incrementally adding candidates based on intermediate analysis results. That is, we first solve a
fairly restricted version of the game, admitting only a small slice of conceivable strategies. Based
on these results, we then generate additional strategy proposals to be added to the candidate set.
Further simulation and analysis produces solutions for an expanded game, which then represents
the starting point for subsequent rounds of refinement.
3.2 Compliance Search
As indicated above, the main novelty in the current work is to focus EGTA on the goal of evaluating
a particular characteristic of strategies—in this instance that of compliance with a network protocol.
The overall flow of the compliance search process is diagrammed in Figure 1. The subprocesses
represented by hexagons are detailed in Sections 3.3 and 3.4.
We start with a seed set of candidate strategies, C ⊂ S. Our compliance incentive analysis
proceeds iteratively, repeating the following steps:
1. Use EGTA (Figure 2) to derive a set of solution candidates (e.g., Nash equilibrium profiles)
X, using strategies only from C. Elements of X are considered open until explicitly closed.
2. Let Xc be the most compliant open solution in X, and Xn the most non-compliant (equiva-
lently, least compliant).
(a) Search SN \C for a beneficial deviation from Xc, using an appropriate strategy search
method. If no deviation can be found, mark Xc as closed.
(b) Search SC \C for a beneficial deviation from Xn, using an appropriate strategy search
method. If no deviation can be found, mark Xn as closed.
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Figure 1: Compliance incentive analysis, searching over a large profile space guided by empirical
game-theoretic analysis.
3. Add the beneficial deviation strategies sd found in the previous steps to C.
The procedure terminates when either all solutions in X are closed, or (usually) we run out of time.
The output is the set of solutions found, along with their open or closed status. We interpret the
degree of compliance in output solutions as evidence for tendency to comply with the protocol.
The high-level version outlined above glosses a few details relevant to our implementation. First,
we assume that the agents are grouped into 1 ≤ R ≤ N roles, and that within each role the game
is symmetric.3 Thus, in place of a single set of strategies S and strategy candidates, C, there are
actually distinct sets of strategies Sr and strategy candidates Cr for each role, r ∈ {1, . . . , R}. The
search for deviations is organized by role. Second, whereas Figure 1 shows the search for compliant
and non-compliant deviations in parallel, we actually alternate between these two modes.
3.3 EGTA Algorithm (Inner Loop)
The function of the EGTA inner loop is to identify and confirm one or more solution candidates,
with respect to a fixed strategy space. We refer to this procedure as an inner loop, as it operates iter-
atively as a subprocess (hexagon labeled “EGTA” in Figure 1) within the overall compliance search
algorithm. The general problem of selectively simulating a profile space for game-theoretic evalua-
tion has been investigated by several researchers [Fearnley et al., 2013, Jordan et al., 2008, Sureka
and Wurman, 2005, Walsh et al., 2003]. Here we adopt a straightforward method that emphasizes
systematicity of the search rather than optimization of simulation effort.
The solution concept we adopt is role-symmetric Nash equilibrium (RSNE).4 A strategy profile
is role-symmetric if, for all roles, each player in that role has the same (mixed) strategy. The support
3This role symmetry assumption is without loss of generality, as we could always have a distinct role for each player
(R = N ). The role construct allows us to exploit whatever player symmetry exists, up to full symmetry (all players in
one role, R = 1). As described below, our IBR analysis classifies network node players into R = 4 roles.
4One could replace this with an alternative solution concept (based on game-theoretic equilibrium or not), with little or
no change to the rest of the search process. The completeness analysis imposes only the relatively weak assumption that
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of a mixed profile is the set of pure profiles played with positive probability. A deviation of a profile
q is a profile q′ where all but one player plays according to q. A profile q is a Nash equilibrium if
there exists no beneficial deviation: a deviation q′ where the deviating player has greater expected
payoff in q′ than does its corresponding player in q. Every finite role-symmetric game has at least
one RSNE.
Often we may be interested in approximate solutions. An -NE is a profile with regret bounded
by , where regret is the maximum gain to any player from deviating from the profile. An exact
NE has zero regret. In general, for  > ′ ≥ 0, we can expect to be able to identify -NE with
less effort than required to identify ′-NE. Moreover, the regret of a profile provides a measure of
its game-theoretic stability, which can be taken as one indicator of its plausibility as the choice of
rational agents.
A high-level description of the EGTA inner loop is presented in Figure 2, with details provided
in pseudocode as Algorithm 1. The loop operates with a fixed strategy space C = (C1, . . . ,CR),
specifying a set of available strategies for each role. The main input to the EGTA inner loop isG(C),
the empirical game comprised of payoff data accumulated thus far for profiles over C. There are
also several parametric inputs:
• τ , a regret threshold,
• ν, the minimum number of samples for initial evaluation, and
• ν?, the minimum number of samples for confirming evaluation.
On each iteration of the loop (as shown in the Figure), we run a game analysis algorithm over the
current empirical game. Game analysis yields a set X of candidate RSNE: role-symmetric profiles
such that all payoffs have been evaluated (i.e., the empirical game has payoff estimates for all
profiles in the support of the candidate), and there is no evaluated deviation with gain exceeding the
regret threshold, τ . We say that such a candidate is confirmed if all possible deviations in the strategy
space C have been evaluated. The solution candidates can thus be partitioned into confirmed (XC)
and unconfirmed (XU ) candidates.
To explain the third output of our game analysis procedure, it is necessary to describe its work-
ings in more detail. Standard game analysis (e.g., equilibrium-finding) algorithms require that the
game form be fully specified: that all payoffs be known. Empirical games, however, generally
have payoffs evaluated for only a subset of profiles. To deal with this issue, our game analysis algo-
rithm starts by identifying complete subgames, that is, strategy subspacesC′ = (C′1, . . . ,C′R), with
C′r ⊆ Cr, for all r, such that all profiles over C′ are evaluated in the empirical game. We restrict
attention to maximal complete subgames, where adding any strategy to any role would render the
subgame incomplete. Note that if a profile q has regret bounded by  in game G(C), then it will
also have regret at most  in any complete subgame G(C′) for which C′ contains the support of q.
The converse is not true—a profile may have low regret in G(C′) but be refuted by a deviation with
respect to the larger strategy space C. Our game analysis thus simply runs standard equilibrium-
finding methods for each maximal complete subgame, filters out the candidates XR that are refuted
in the full profile space, and merges the rest to produce XC and XU .
a solution exists, so that an exhaustive exploration would eventually find it. We also exploit the property that a solution
x of the game is also a solution to any subgame for which x is defined. This is true for RSNE (and NE-based concepts
generally) in normal-form games, but solution concepts for which this fails may not be a good match for our procedure.
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Figure 2: EGTA inner loop.
If the game analysis reveals unconfirmed candidates, we attempt to confirm or refute them
by scheduling simulations of the unevaluated deviations. We specify the profiles to be scheduled
in terms of the target profile set (i.e., support of the candidate), the deviation strategy sets (i.e.,
strategies outside that support, taken role-by-role), and the number of samples requested. Our EGTA
infrastructure [Cassell and Wellman, 2013] manages a cumulative database of profile simulation
results, and determines exactly how many new simulations of each relevant profile are required to
reach the number requested. Once collected, the new simulation results are added to the empirical
game, which may of course change the candidate set. We therefore repeat the game analysis and
deviation scheduling until there are no unconfirmed candidates.
If we have at least one confirmed candidate and no unconfirmed candidates, the inner loop
terminates and returns XC . One fine point of our implementation of this procedure is that we
require a greater number of samples, ν? > ν, to label a candidate confirmed than we do to evaluate
its candidate status initially. Thus we ensure that all profiles in the support of purported confirmed
solutions have at least ν? samples, scheduling additional simulations if necessary and re-running
game analysis to verify that the results still hold.
If there are no candidate solutions, then we need to further explore the current profile space.
Given our game analysis algorithm, evaluating additional profiles cannot affect results unless the
additional profiles lead to completion of a new maximal subgame. Our first exploration effort aims
to complete subgames that appear promising based on existing results. Specifically, for any case
where profile q is a τ -RSNE of a maximal subgame G(C′), but the best evaluated response to q is
some strategy sr 6∈ C′r in the larger game, we consider the subgame defined by adding sr to the
support of q. If all such subgames have already been explored yet still no confirmed equilibria have
been found,5 the procedure then nondeterministically chooses to extend one of the current maximal
subgames. In the worst case, this process can lead to exhaustive exploration of the profile space,
which necessarily contains at least one RSNE, which would be confirmed at that point.
To guarantee that the EGTA inner loop returns a confirmed solution candidate requires that the
equilibrium-finding procedure is itself complete. Our implementation uses an incomplete method
5It may seem counterintuitive, but this can happen. For example, consider a three-player symmetric game with three
strategies {A,B,C} such that all profiles except (A,B,C) have been evaluated. We could have a situation exhibiting
a circular response pattern reminiscent of rock-paper-scissors, such as the following: (A,A,A) is the equilibrium of
subgame {A,B}, with best-response C; (B,B,B) is the equilibrium of subgame {B,C}, with best-response A; and
(C,C,C) is the equilibrium of subgame {A,C}, with best-response B. All best-response-enhanced subgames have been
evaluated, but to find the true equilibrium (which has full support), we need the missing profile.
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(replicator dynamics), so we may sometimes fail to find any RSNE through this process.
Notes to Algorithm 1:
1. support(q) denotes the support of a profile q.
2. ScheduleDeviation(Q,S, n) generates simulations for profiles formed by deviating from
profiles in set Q to strategies in role:strategy mapping S, until at least n of each are accu-
mulated.
3. ScheduleSubgame(S, n) generates simulations for profiles comprising strategies in role:strategy
mapping S, until at least n of each are accumulated.
4. incrSubgame() returns a minimal strategy set that is not a complete subgame in the current
empirical game.
5. At termination, the empirical game over C is augmented such that all RSNE candidates are
confirmed or refuted.
3.4 Strategy Exploration Algorithm (Outer Loop)
Completion of an EGTA inner loop leaves us in a state with one or more solutions that are con-
firmed with respect to the current strategy space, C. This space is a highly selective subset of the
full strategy space, S, which is too large to consider wholesale in EGTA. The function of strategy
exploration in compliance search (hexagons labeled “Search for (non-)compliant deviation” in Fig-
ure 1) is to augment C with promising strategies not yet included in the game-theoretic analysis.
One natural approach is to attempt to identify a beneficial deviation, or indeed the best-response
deviation in the broader strategy space S to a current solution candidate. For example, Phelps
et al. [2006] employed genetic algorithms to generate strategies for trading in continuous double
auctions, evaluated by evolutionary criteria with respect to an existing strategy mix. In an EGTA
study in the same domain, Schvartzman and Wellman [2009] employed reinforcement learning to
search a large strategy space for an optimal response to the current equilibrium trading strategy.
Best-response is generally not an ideal policy for introducing new strategies [Jordan et al., 2010],
as it completely prioritizes exploitation over exploration, and takes no account of performance with
respect to strategies not currently in equilibrium. Nevertheless, it has proven an effective heuristic
in several domains, and the imperfection of optimization in practice does appear to provide a useful
source of randomness in exploration.
Our strategy exploration method likewise employs a heuristic best-response search, with the
further refinement of directing the search alternately toward compliant or non-compliant deviations.
This explicit direction represents an exercise of due diligence, ensuring that any conclusions based
on solutions in one category (i.e., compliant or non-compliant) have been vetted by an express search
for deviations in the complement category. The specific algorithm we employ for best-response
search takes a stochastic hill-climbing approach, described in detail below.
The description of our procedure assumes that strategies can be described as vectors ofK policy
parameters, pi = 〈pi1, . . . , piK〉.6 For example, IBR policies include parameters for how much
to increment or decrement reputations based on feedback reports, and reputation thresholds for
6More general representations could be accommodated with modifications to the way that compliance is assessed, and
how strategies are modified incrementally in local search.
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Algorithm 1 EGTA Inner Loop
Input: Strategy spaceC = (C1, . . . ,CR), Empirical game G(C), Regret threshold τ , Numbers of
required samples ν and ν?
Output: Confirmed mixed RSNE {q : (q) ≤ τ ; all deviations of q evaluated}
foundConfirmed ← false
while ¬foundConfirmed do
repeat
(XC ,XU ,XR)← GameAnalysis(G(C), τ)
for q ∈ XU do
ScheduleDeviation(support(q),C \ StrategiesIn(q), ν)
end for
untilXU is empty
ifXC 6= ∅ then
foundConfirmed ← true
for q ∈ XC do
if foundConfirmed ∧minSamples(support(q)) < ν? then
ScheduleSubgame(StrategiesIn, ν?)
foundConfirmed ← false
end if
end for
else
explored ← false
for q ∈ XR do
if ¬explored ∧ ¬Subgame(StrategiesIn(q) + BestResponse(q)) then
explored ← true
ScheduleSubgame(StrategiesIn(q) + BestResponse(q), ν?)
end if
end for
if ¬explored then
ScheduleSubgame(incrSubgame(), ν)
end if
end if
end while
returnXC
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deciding whether to accept an introduction. Each parameter takes values in a specified domain,
pii ∈ Πi. If all combinations are legal (also assumed here, for simplicity), then the cross-product of
domains defines the overall strategy space, S = Π1 × · · · × ΠK . Let compliance : S → < be a
function that evaluates the degree of compliance of a strategy. Strategy pi is considered compliant if
and only if compliance(pi) > 0. Note that using a graded compliance scale is optional; one could
define a compliance function that simply maps all policies to {−1, 1}.
Our invocations of strategy exploration alternate between compliant and non-compliant modes.
For concreteness, we describe the process for non-compliant mode, where the aim is to find a non-
compliant deviation from a particular solution candidate. The compliant mode simply reverses
polarity in this description. Each run of strategy exploration focuses on a particular role ρ, which
we rotate through in successive invocations, taking care to switch compliance modes between con-
secutive runs for the same role.
The input solution profile for strategy exploration is selected from among the confirmed so-
lutions XC produced by the most recent EGTA inner loop. We eliminate from consideration
any closed solutions, designated as such because they have already been fully explored. In non-
compliant mode, we select the most compliant open solution in XC . To evaluate compliance of a
profile, we combine the compliance scores of its components. Let Pr(qr = pi) denote the prob-
ability that strategy pi is played by players of role r in q, and wr a weight expressing the relative
importance we accord to role r. Then the compliance of profile q is given by
compliance(q) =
R∑
r=1
wr
∑
pi∈Cr
Pr(qr = pi)compliance(pi).
One natural role weighting (which we employ in the IBR study) is wr = Nr, the number of players
assigned to the role.
The generation of new strategy candidates proceeds iteratively. The heart of the algorithm is
a procedure, LocalVariations , that given a seed set of parametrically defined strategies, returns a
set of incremental variations. It aims to find variations that are close to one of the seed strategies,
subject to the constraints that they be distinct from strategies already explored, and match the re-
quested compliance status. The procedure must return at least one such variation, though the actual
number may be variable or domain-dependent. The specific technique is also domain-dependent.
For IBR, LocalVariations generates candidates by perturbing each of the parameters of each of the
seed strategies by set increments, increasing this increment until at least one variation satisfies the
constraints. The initial seed strategies are those supported in the candidate solution.
As illustrated in Figure 3 and detailed in pseudocode by Algorithm 2, the generated variations
are evaluated by scheduling deviation profiles for simulation. Once these are complete, we select
them best of these for additional simulation samples. Based on the refined deviation-gain estimates
we obtain from this, we select the top m′ of these as seed strategies for the next iteration. For the
IBR study, we take m = 5 and m′ = 2.
In each iteration, we keep track of the highest payoff seen so far. If this fails to improve, we
terminate and return the best of the newly explored strategies. If this is actually a beneficial devia-
tion, it gets added to the candidate strategy set Cρ, and per the top-level search process (Figure 1),
proceed back to the EGTA inner loop. If it is not a beneficial deviation, we record failure and try
again with a different role and compliance state. If all roles and compliance states have been tried
without success, then we mark this solution candidate as closed and proceed to the next candidate.
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Figure 3: Generating new strategy candidates by local search in parameter space.
Algorithm 2 Strategy Exploration Outer Loop (non-compliant mode, role ρ)
Input: Empirical gameG(C), Open confirmed solution candidatesXC , Numbers of required sam-
ples ν and ν?, Numbers of strategies to select m and m′
Output: New compliant strategy to add to Cρ
q ← arg maxq∈XC compliance(q)
SeedStrategies ← support(qρ)
Explored ← Cρ
newPayoff ← −∞
repeat
bestPayoff ← newPayoff
CandSet ← LocalVariations(SeedStrategies,Explored ,noncompliant)
ScheduleDeviation(support(q),CandSet , ν)
Explored ← Explored ∪ CandSet
ScheduleDeviation(support(q),SelectBestDeviators(q, ρ,CandSet ,m), ν?)
SeedStrategies ← SelectBestDeviators(q, ρ,CandSet ,m′)
newPayoff ← maxs∈SeedStrategies(uρ(s, q))
until newPayoff ≤ bestPayoff
return SelectBestDeviators(q, ρ,Explored \Cρ, 1)
Notes to Algorithm 2:
1. LocalVariations(S1, S2, c) returns a nonempty set of strategy variations close to some strat-
egy in S1, distinct from S2, and consistent with compliance state c.
2. uρ(s, q) denotes the payoff to a player of role ρ playing strategy s when the remaining players
play according to profile q.
3. SelectBestDeviators(q, ρ, CS,m) evaluates the payoff to a role ρ player deviating from pro-
file q by playing s, for each strategy s ∈ CS. It then returns the m best strategies according
to this evaluation, or the entire set CS if |CS| ≤ m.
4 IBR Compliance Analysis
We evaluate our general compliance search procedure through a computationally intensive case
study of introduction-based routing. In this section, we describe how the general methods are spe-
cialized for IBR, and present the experimental setup and results of this study.
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4.1 Environments
We conduct our analysis in three IBR game environments, sharing a basic network structure but
differing on the numbers of nodes and players, and in attack model characteristics. The network
connection topology (Figure 4) is a redundant tree, with nR fully connected introducers at the root
and the clients and servers at the leaves. Each client and server has a single a priori connection to
an introducer, notionally playing the role of ISP. Thus, each client-server connection requires be-
tween one and four introductions to establish. There are nI ISPs in the network, each connected to
a randomly selected pair of the root introducers. Each of the ISPs also has χ clients and one server
attached, for a total of nC = χnI client nodes and nS = nI server nodes. The configuration param-
eters nR, nI , and χ thus determine the numbers of nodes of every role, as well as the connectivity
structure of the network.
Regular/	  
Reputa,on	  
A0ackers	  
nR	  Roots	  
nI	  ISPs	  
nC	  Clients	  
(χ	  per	  ISP)	  
nS	  Servers	  
(one	  per	  ISP)	  
Figure 4: The topology of a priori connections in the subject network.
A simulation run plays out an IBR scenario for 10,000 time units. An active client generates a
message, directed to a server selected uniformly at random, and then goes to sleep for a number of
time units ∼ U [0, 39]. As a result, each client sends 330 messages in an average run. In addition,
na attacker nodes each select a random target at the start of simulation, after which messages sent to
this target are attacks with probability 0.05. Attacks are detected with probability 0.9, and succeed
with probability 0.3 if not detected. Non-attacks are falsely detected with probability 0.001. A
further set of nra reputation attackers generate false attack reports for a random target. Both forms
of attacker are part of the network, but follow fixed behaviors and are thus not represented as players
in the game.
Our experiments covered three network configurations, described in Table 1. For instance, the
network configuration for environment 1 has nR = 7, nI = 49, and χ = 99, thus comprising
4956 nodes: seven roots, 49 ISPs, 49 servers, and 4851 clients. A simulation of this configuration
comprises an average of 3.2 million application messages and takes on the order of ten minutes
12
env nR(NR) nI(NI) χ(NC) (NS) na nra nodes (players)
1 7 (1) 49 (1) 99 (3) (1) 49 49 4956 (6)
2 3 (1) 18 (2) 33 (3) (2) 48 16 633 (8)
3 5 (1) 30 (2) 66 (2) (1) 90 30 2045 (6)
Table 1: Network configurations employed in our IBR compliance analysis. The final column totals
the non-attacking nodes—clients, servers, roots, and ISPs—and players in the game.
on a single CPU per run.7 Beyond the network structure, all configurations employ the same sim-
ulation settings, except that in environment 1 the attackers choose only server targets, whereas in
environments 2 and 3 they attack both clients and servers.
Game-theoretic analysis with hundreds or thousands of players would be computationally in-
feasible, therefore we employ aggregation techniques to approximate the game by one with fewer
players. Specifically, we use hierarchical reduction [Wellman et al., 2005], which combines mul-
tiple nodes of a given role into single players. With this reduction, for instance our 4956-agent
environment is modeled as a six-player game, comprising:
• three clients, each representing 1617 client nodes;
• one ISP introducer, representing the 49 ISP nodes;
• one root introducer, representing the seven root nodes; and
• one server, representing the 49 server nodes.
To simulate a profile in the reduced game, the strategy assigned to a given player is played by all
nodes represented by that player. The resulting payoff for the player is simply the average over
payoffs to its constituent nodes.
4.2 Simulation Coverage
We perform our simulations on the computational cluster facility operated by the Center for Ad-
vanced Computing at the University of Michigan. Our compliance search is implemented by a
control script that employs our EGTAOnline facility [Cassell and Wellman, 2013], a front-end that
facilitates game-theoretic experiment management through an integration of cluster monitoring,
database services, and analysis algorithms. Between May 2012 and May 2013 we ran well over
three million simulations of IBR network scenarios in service of this compliance analysis.
Table 2 summarizes the extent of compliance search for our three IBR network environments.
For each environment, we report the number of iterations of the outer loop completed, and the scope
of exploration. Scope is measured by strategies in candidate set (sum over roles), the number of
these that were auto-generated in the outer loop, profiles evaluated (number and percentage of profile
space), and the total number of simulation runs. These numbers do not include any simulation
evaluation that was incurred in the outer loop for strategies that did not make it into the candidate
set.
7Message volume and running times scale roughly proportionally with network size.
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env iters strategies auto-gen profiles % profiles sim runs
1 9 25 9 7808 36% 778k
2 23 37 21 61272 2% 2566k
3 33 29 21 2515 23% 54k
Table 2: Compliance search over three environments.
The difference between columns “strategies” and “auto-gen” in Table 2 is the number of man-
ually defined seed strategies included. In all environments, we included for each role a basic com-
pliant policy supplied by the IBR protocol designers [Frazier et al., 2011], and a non-compliant
policy that makes introductions and accepts connections indiscriminately, oblivious to reputations
and feedback. For environments 1 and 2, the initial sets include two additional compliant policies
for each role. The difference between columns “iters” and “auto-gen” in the table is the number of
times the outer loop returned a strategy that was not a beneficial deviation from the target profile,
and thus was not added to the strategy space.
The exploration and simulation process occurred over a period of many months, during which
the procedure was not entirely constant. In particular, the ordering of various search steps, as well as
some thresholds and other parameters were tuned in the course of running the compliance analysis of
environment 1, and into the beginning part of our environment 2 analysis. Moreover, our empirical
game for environment 1 includes many simulations that were manually scheduled in order to refine
payoff estimates and accelerate the inner loop. All runs of the outer loop were fully automated, as
was the entire process for environments 2 and 3.
Parameter settings (Table 3) were fixed for all of our analysis of environment 3, and most of the
environment 2 analysis. Regret thresholds τ represent a tiny fraction of payoffs, which generally
exceed 105 for roots and ISPs, and 106 for clients and servers.
inner loop outer loop
env τ ν ν? ν ν? m m′
1 100 40 80 15 40 5 2
2 20 40 80 15 40 5 2
3 70 20 40 10 20 5 2
Table 3: Parameter settings employed in compliance search process.
4.3 Results
We present detailed results for each of the IBR network environments studied, followed by an overall
assessment.
4.3.1 Environment 1 (6 players, 4956 nodes)
The first environment studied is the largest network, almost 5000 nodes. The empirical game for this
environment includes 7808 evaluated profiles, which cover 157 maximal subgames. There are many
confirmed solutions at the regret threshold τ = 100. Table 4 presents, in increasing regret order,
14
the 11 -RSNE we identified8 with  ≤ 10. We label by Ck (Nk) the compliant (non-compliant)
strategy generated in iteration k of the outer loop. N (with no number) denotes the initial non-
compliant (oblivious) strategy, C the initial designer-specified compliant strategy, and C’ another
initially supplied compliant strategy. Mixed strategies are written [s1, p1; s2, p2; . . . ], indicating
strategy si is played with probability pi. The last probability is omitted as it is determined by the
rest.
client ISP root server regret ()
[N3, .10;N7, .34;N] [N, .62;C’] N5 C6 0.0
[C, .33;C2, .22;N7] N1 C C6 0.0
[C, .16;N3] N1 [C, .68;C8] C6 0.2
[N3, .25;N7, .43;N] N [C, .38;C8, .10;N5] C6 1.0
[N3, .24;N7, .41;N] N [C, .36;N5] C6 1.3
[C, .16;C4, .11;N3] C9 [C8, .48;N5] C6 5.8
[N3, .34;N7] C’ C8 C6 6.7
[N3, .33;N7, .66;C’] C’ C8 C6 7.0
[C2, .32;C’] [N, .74;C’] C8 C6 8.3
[C, .46;N3] C9 [C, .06;C8, .18;N5] C6 8.6
[C4, .77;N] C9 C C6 9.8
Table 4: Confirmed 10-RSNE of environment 1, in ascending order of regret.
The first feature one might notice from Table 4 is that servers always play strategy C6. Indeed,
this is true for all approximate equilibria in all subgames that include C6. This strategy was au-
tomatically generated by our exploration procedure (Algorithm 2), and is significantly better than
all other server strategies evaluated, including the designer-supplied compliant strategy C. Servers
apparently have a strong incentive to comply with the IBR protocol, and an effective way to do so.
That servers exhibit the greatest compliance is perhaps not surprising in this environment, as they
are the only nodes that are subject to attack.
Compliance for other nodes is far less constant. Root nodes tend to comply in 8 of 11 of the
RSNE, but clients and ISPs exhibit a fairly balanced choice between compliant and non-compliant
strategies. It appears that the indirect benefits from participating faithfully in IBR for nodes not
subject to attack is fairly weak. The costs, however, are also weak, as we do not see a very strong
leaning toward non-compliance for any role. Assessing overall compliance depends on the relative
importance we accord the various roles. Clients represent 1/4 of the roles, but 3/6 of the players and
4851/4956 of the nodes. Table 5 summarizes the overall fraction of compliance in the top equilib-
rium profiles, according to different ways of weighting the respective roles: evenly, by number of
players, or number of nodes.
8We include at most one solution (the best) with any particular support, and impose a minimum probability at which
a strategy may be included in a mixed profile. Any approximate RSNE is surrounded by a region of almost-as-good
approximate equilibria in its neighborhood.
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soln role player node
1 34.5% 23.0% 1.4%
2 63.7% 60.8% 54.9%
3 79.0% 58.1% 17.9%
4 37.0% 24.7% 1.1%
5 33.9% 22.6% 1.0%
6 68.7% 54.8% 28.5%
7 75.0% 50.0% 2.1%
8 75.2% 50.5% 3.1%
9 81.6% 87.7% 99.3%
10 67.7% 60.6% 47.4%
11 94.1% 88.3% 77.1%
Table 5: Overall fraction of compliance for each solution, for various role weightings.
4.3.2 Environment 2 (8 players, 633 nodes)
Environment 2 incorporates three significant changes from environment 1. First, the network is
scaled down to about one-eighth the size. Second, despite fewer nodes, we increased the number
of players (i.e., adopted a less coarse hierarchical reduction), so that both ISPs and servers are
represented by two players. Third, we include attacks on clients as well as servers. The numbers of
attackers are scaled so that the level of attack on any eligible target is roughly the same. (Reputation
attacks are still addressed to servers only.)
As indicated in Table 2, the empirical game generated for this environment is considerably
larger, covering over 60,000 profiles over 37 strategies (7–10 per role). The analysis yields 13
10-RSNE, listed in Table 6. Names are as for environment 1, with the addition of C”, a designer-
supplied compliant strategy constructed expressly to deal with reputation attacks.
client ISP root server 
C11 [C4, .29;C21, .10;N1, .31;N12] [C’, .18;C2, .31;C9, .01;N5, .31;N16] C” 4.7
C11 [C15, .45;N] [C, .38;C19] [C”,.72;C13] 5.2
C11 [C’, .01;C15, .45;N] [C, .38;C19] [C”,.72;C13] 5.7
C11 [C4, .29;C21, .07;N1, .27;N12] [C, .21;C2, .56;C9, .07;N] C” 7.0
C11 [C4, .29;C21, .07;N1, .27;N12] [C’, .05;C2, .31;N5, .62;N16] C” 7.1
C11 [C4, .24;C21, .03;N1, .35;N12] [C2, .38;N5] C” 7.5
C11 [C’, .02;C4, .72;N12] [C, .30;C9, .31;N16] C13 7.9
C11 [C’, .31;N, .45;N12] [C2, .30;N16] [C”,.25;C6] 8.3
C11 [C’, .10;C4, .57;N, .17;N12] [C, .17;C”, .22;C2, .25;N5, .28; C6
N16, .06;N22] 9.1
[C11, .80; [C’, .29;C4, .65;N12] C2 C6
C17] 9.3
C11 [C’, .08;C4, .55;N, .16;N12] [C, .04;C”, .18;C2, .37;N5, .35;N16] C6 9.7
C11 [C’, .36;N, .01;N1, .25;N12] [C, .25;C’, .01;C2] C” 9.9
C11 [C12, .32;N] [C, .23;N16, .65;N22] [C”,.23;C6] 9.9
Table 6: Confirmed 10-RSNE of environment 2, in ascending order of regret.
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Once again, we see that the nodes that are subject to attack—clients as well as servers in this
case—are universally compliant, and relatively consistent in strategy across the top confirmed solu-
tions. The intermediaries who serve only as introducers in these scenarios have a much more varied
strategy selection. The overall compliance fractions are presented in Table 7.
soln role player node
1 72.2% 78.5% 98.0%
2 86.4% 86.4% 98.4%
3 86.4% 86.4% 98.5%
4 72.7% 74.6% 97.3%
5 68.2% 76.2% 97.9%
6 66.1% 73.9% 97.6%
7 83.8% 88.6% 99.1%
8 65.3% 74.0% 97.7%
9 82.7% 87.1% 98.9%
10 98.3% 98.3% 99.8%
11 80.7% 85.7% 98.8%
12 84.1% 84.1% 98.2%
13 55.8% 65.4% 96.8%
Table 7: Overall fraction of compliance for each solution, for various role weightings.
4.3.3 Environment 3 (6 players, 2045 nodes)
The third environment is intermediate in size between the other two. It is defined for six players:
two clients, two ISPs, one root, and one server. As for environment 2, both clients and servers are
subject to attack.
This environment was evaluated through 33 iterations, albeit with many fewer simulation sam-
ples than the previous environments. The result is a single confirmed equilibrium at τ = 70. The
solution is a PSNE, that is a pure-strategy profile with zero regret:
client ISP root server regret ()
C33 N N6 N4 0.0
In contrast to the other environments, here the servers are non-compliant, even though subject
to attack. The overall compliance for this profile is 25.0% by role, 33.3% by player, and 96.8% by
node. Although we lack a definitive explanation for the non-compliance of servers, there are sev-
eral reasons to view this result as providing only weak evidence against the general compliance of
nodes under attack. First, on examination of its specific policy parameters, we find server strategy
N4 is actually close to the borderline we defined between compliant and non-compliant strategies.
In fact it is partially compliant, as it does adjust reputations to some degree based on reports, and
does regard these reputations in decision making. It is classified as non-compliant because these ad-
justments do not meet the levels we had (somewhat arbitrarily) defined as required for compliance.
Second, strategy N4 is only slightly preferred to compliant server strategy C23 ( = 22) given the
other players’ strategies in this profile. In contrast, the best non-compliant client deviation for this
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profile has regret of 1275. Finally, the result seems sensitive to the client strategy C33, which was
introduced in the final iteration of this evaluation. If we omit this strategy, the sole equilibrium is
the following PSNE, in which all roles but the ISP are compliant:
client ISP root server regret ()
C27 N C9 C29 0.0
4.3.4 Discussion
We find across all three environments an incentive for substantial but not universal compliance.
Given that following the protocol incurs a modest cost in forgoing connections that might prove
valuable, the compliance we see is evidence for its benefits in attack resistance. Incentives to comply
tend to be quite strong for nodes subject to attack, and relatively weak for intermediary nodes. That
full compliance is never an equilibrium is not very surprising. Intuitively, once a critical fraction of
other agents are complying with IBR, the network is protected enough that remaining agents need
not comply in order to preserve network performance. Another interpretation is that the marginal
security benefit of compliance is diminishing beyond a certain point. Further extension and analysis
of the empirical game may yield a more precise characterization of this phenomenon, and the general
shape of costs and benefits of IBR compliance.
5 Conclusion
The goal of this effort was to develop a systematic way to evaluate incentive properties of complex
network protocols, employing large-scale simulation in service of strategic analysis according to
game-theoretic principles. Our hypothesis is that we could organize a process of searching over a
large set of policy profiles by focusing attention on regions that are most relevant to resolving the
compliance/non-compliance distinction. The procedure we defined and implemented addresses two
key search issues: control of simulation over a fixed strategy space (inner loop), and exploration of
a broader policy space to identify new promising strategies (outer loop).
As a case study, we applied this procedure to evaluate compliance with an interesting network
security protocol: introduction-based routing. The IBR study drove refinement of the algorithm, and
enabled us to exercise both of its key components. Though far from exhaustive, this investigation
provided clear evidence that participants vulnerable to attack have substantial incentive to comply
with the protocol, and this in conjunction with partial compliance by others is sufficient to achieve
the protocol’s security aims. The results suggest that further attention should be paid to enhancing
incentives to intermediary nodes, and the simulation data provides a basis for a more in-depth game-
theoretic analysis.
Further research is required to understand the procedure’s suitability for other domains, and to
assess its strengths and weaknesses. One natural question is robustness: whether in fact qualitative
conclusions about compliance are insensitive to specific choices in representation, search control,
and search extent. Preliminary evidence suggests that the qualitative results are indeed relatively
stable, particularly as compared to game-theoretic conclusions about specific policy instances. An-
other issue to address is the computationally intensiveness of the procedure. On the one hand, part
of the whole idea is to take advantage of large-scale computational resources that are increasingly
available for efforts of this kind. On the other, we would always prefer to get the most power from
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any given amount of simulation effort, and no doubt further experience will be required to identify
the best ways to direct that effort toward the greatest impact on strategic insight.
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